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Abstract
How should institutions convey relevant information to the public? Should they sched-
ule their communications or release information as it becomes available? What are the
welfare eects of an unanticipated information release? We model a decentralized econ-
omy and show that a credible schedule delays trade towards the information release
date and unanticipated information arrivals entail a loss of insurance opportunities.
We apply these ndings to the scheduling of monetary policy decisions following the
Federal Open Market Committee meetings from 1995 till 2010 and its eects on the dy-
namics of trade on the Federal Funds Futures market. We use the model to empirically
identify periods of credible (prior to 2001) and non-credible scheduling (after 2001).
Finally we measure the loss in risk-trading activity due to o schedule announcements.
Keywords: Deadline eect, Hirshleifer eect, search in nancial markets,
monetary announcements, interest rate futures.
JEL classication number: D83, G12, G14, E58.
1. Introduction
The value of public information is among the fundamental questions in economics and -
nance. A strictly related issue is how public and private agencies should convey information
Corresponding author. School of Social Sciences, Economics Division, University of Southampton,
Southampton SO17 1BJ, U.K., Tel. +44(0)23 8059 3529, giulio.seccia@soton.ac.uk.
yWe would like to thank John Knowles and Alberto Bisin for very helpful comments. All errors are ours.
1to the public. Should these agencies schedule their communications or release the informa-
tion as it becomes available? Once a schedule is in place, how important is the credibility of
the procedure? Today, many public institutions release information according to a schedule
of announcements: this is the case of central banks announcing target interest rates at the
end of the respective monetary policy committee meetings and of governmental agencies,
like the Bureau of Labor Statistics, responsible for the ocial release of economic statistics
on unemployment and ination.
Little consideration has been given to the eects of such scheduling on the trade dynamics and
on welfare. The theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that observables like trade
volume dynamics can identify welfare eects of credible scheduling. In particular we will
address the following questions: 1) Does scheduling communications change the dynamics
of trade and if so how? 2) What are the welfare costs of \spontaneous" deviations from the
schedule i.e., o schedule announcements? 3) Can the reliability of the schedule be inferred
from the dynamics of trade?
These issues are rst analyzed in a theoretical model. We then apply the model to identify
the eects of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) scheduled and o schedule
monetary policy announcements on the trading volume of Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
30-Day Federal Funds Futures.
The theoretical model studies nancial markets under uncertainty where traders have access
to two nancial instruments: a risk-free bond and a risky asset. The risk-free bond is
exchanged in a centralized market. The risky asset is exchanged over-the-counter according
to a dynamic matching procedure where at each point in time buyers and sellers meet
and declare their reservation price: if an agreement is reached they split the gains from
trade equally and leave the market; otherwise they continue their search for a counterparty.
Uncertainty is resolved by a public announcement reaching the market at some future date
that might or might not be known to the traders. The announcement reveals the state of
the world determining the risky asset return and the agents' endowment at the end of the
economy. Agents are symmetrically informed about both the realization and the timing of
2the announcement as in the case of many public announcements like interest rates decisions.
In the rst instance, the model analyzes the dynamics of trade when agents know the exact
date the uncertainty will resolve (credible schedule); subsequently the model studies the case
when the exact date is unknown to the agents (stochastic announcements).
We can summarize the results of the theoretical model as follows: 1) if (and only if) agents
are risk averse, scheduling the communications changes trade dynamics by delaying a large
volume of transactions towards the announcement date. This is the deadline eect of credible
scheduling; 2) when risk averse agents exchange the asset in order to hedge uncertainty,
spontaneous deviations from the schedule might be welfare impairing as once uncertainty
is resolved risk sharing opportunities are lost. This is as in Hirshleifer (1971)1. 3) with
stochastic announcements (it suces a small but positive probability of an o schedule
intervention), both deadline and welfare eects vanish.
The crucial insight of the analysis is that perfectly anticipated future arrivals of payo-
relevant public information act as a trading deadline for risk averse investors: when the
schedule is reliable, traders act as if they had a limited time to exchange the risky asset as,
once uncertainty is resolved, this becomes redundant and ceases to be a hedging instrument.
We apply these theoretical ndings to the FOMC monetary policy scheduling from January
1995 to July 2010 and look at the impact on the dynamics of trade of the CBOT 30-Day
Federal Funds Futures market. We rst study the deadline eect by checking if the volume
of transactions is higher the days before a scheduled meeting. Our empirical analysis shows
a statistically signicant deadline eect for meetings prior to September 2001. We identify
this split in the data set by employing rolling windows of 400 trading days with 60 days of
overlapping gap. The two periods have a dierent monetary policy scheduling credibility:
high till 2001 and less so afterwards. Unfortunately our model does not shed light on the
reasons causing this shift in credibility.
We then turn to the evidence on the welfare eect. Interest rate futures are traded over-the-
1Notice that our model, for tractability reasons, will focus on the Hirshleifer eect only and will not
account for the other benets of receiving the information earlier rather than later (the \Blackwell eect"
after Blackwell (1951)). On the comparison of the two eects see Gottardi and Rahi (2008).
3counter in order to hedge against changes in the target rate. If monetary policy scheduling
is credible, an unanticipated resolution of uncertainty, due to an o schedule announcement,
could be welfare impairing in the sense pointed out by Hirshleifer (1971). Although a sub-
stantial theoretical literature has extended and qualied Hirshleifer's result and identied
suciently general conditions for the argument to hold2, the empirical evidence is at best
sparse3, probably due to the diculty in identifying instances where risk averse traders are
\taken by surprise" by the earlier resolution of uncertainty. It seems natural to ask whether
the welfare eect pointed out by Hirshleifer is a purely theoretical conjecture with little
empirical relevance or, to the contrary, there are important instances where we observe its
occurrence. If so what is the magnitude of the loss, either in terms of welfare or of trading
volumes?
The o schedule FOMC meetings, all occurring in the period identied as of credible schedul-
ing, provide the opportunity for running a natural experiment on the eects of monetary
policy surprises. We rst argue that these events were indeed unanticipated by showing that
there was no signicant excess trading activity before their occurrence. We then quantify
the missed expected volume of trade following these surprises.
Modeling nancial markets with decentralized mechanisms is not new and these are empiri-
cally relevant in the interest rate futures market. The search theoretic literature on nancial
markets includes Due, G^ arleanu and Pedersen (2005) and (2007), Miao (2006) and Rust
and Hall (2003), Lagos and Rocheteau (2007) and (2009). A distinctive feature of our case
is that trade occurs under deadlines and hence we cannot analyze steady states.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model and the results. Section 3 presents the empirical
model and the analysis. Section 4 concludes. With the exception of Theorem 1, all proofs
2With dierent degrees of generality, Marshall (1974), Green (1981) and Hakansson et al. (1982) identify
cases where a partial increase of information cannot be Pareto improving. Wilson (1975) shows that better
information is Pareto impairing when agents have preferences represented by a log utility function. More
recently, Schlee (2001) has given general conditions guaranteeing that public information is Pareto impairing
and Eckwert and Zilcha (2003) have showed that information referring to tradable assets might be undesirable
if agents are enough risk averse. Finally Gottardi and Rahi (2008) have provided sucient conditions on
the degree of market incompleteness for the information to have social value. For further discussion of the
literature see Schlee (2001) and Gottardi and Rahi (2008).
3The only pieces of evidence we are aware of come from medical studies, in particular Lerman et al.
(1996) and Quaid and Morris (1993).
4can be found in the appendix.
2. Description of the economy
We consider an innite horizon, one-good economy under uncertainty, extending over time
t 2 [0;1].
The economy is populated by the traders and the information provider. Traders have access
to two nancial instruments: a risk-free bond and a risky asset. The bond is traded in
competitive markets, is perfectly divisible, its net supply is zero and pays one unit of the
good after the state has realized. The asset is traded over-the-counter (OTC), is indivisible
and oers a stochastic return () :  ! R+ payable to the asset holder at t = 1. Traders
are partitioned into two types, denoted by a = b;s: the buyers, a = b; holding no assets; the
sellers, a = s; holding one unit of the asset. There is a continuum of agents on each side of
the market. Buyers and sellers meet according to the mechanism we will describe later and,
for simplicity, they exchange one, indivisible unit of the asset: this is for tractability but not
unrealistic in the case of trade of contracts of large size as interest rates futures.
At t = 0;1 each agent receives a stochastic and agent-specic endowment !t() :  ! R+
with R+ the support of the distribution.
The only role of the information provider is to announce the state of the world. We will
start by analyzing the game when the announcement date is common knowledge among the
players, xed for convenience at t = 1, and fully credible. In section 2.7 we will analyze the
case where the announcement is stochastic, i.e., where the information provider releases of
information at any other t 2 (0;1) with positive probability.
The good is non-storable. Consumption takes place right after trading, denoted by x0 and
after the state has realized, denoted by x1. Agents' preferences are time and state separable,
and represented by the same utility function:
u(x0) + Eu(x1);
Notice that there are no transaction costs nor costs of holding the asset between the date
5the trade occurs and the realization of the state.
Assumption 1. The utility function u() is strictly increasing and concave.
For tractability we assume that the bond market opens at t = 1, once the trade in the OTC
market has been exhausted and before uncertainty is realized. Agents decide how much to
buy/sell of the asset and then how many units of the bond to hold. Since the structure of
the economy is common knowledge, agents can compute the price the bond will trade at and
will take this into account when deciding the asking and bidding price of the asset.
2.1 The OTC matching process
We discretize the time interval [0,1] by partitioning it into L+1 subperiods, l = 1;:::;L; each
of length  = (L + 1) 1: Each t = l denotes a trading session in the OTC market. Trade
does not take place at t = 1 and between trading sessions. Let T = f;::;l;:::;Lg denote
the set of trading sessions.
At session t 2 T each agent is characterized by his type, the endowment !0 and the history
ht 2 Ht = fin;outg: The history parameter ht takes value in when a trader is active in the
market. Each active buyer is matched randomly to one active seller. Once the match occurs
they contemporarily declare their reservation price. If the bid is greater or equal to the ask
price, exchange takes place, agents consume and their history takes value out: Buyers and
sellers that fail to exchange proceed to the next trading session where (almost surely) they
will meet a dierent counterparty. At each trading session the agents also decide how much
of the bond to purchase on the competitive market. The agents not able to trade by the last
session t = L trade the bond and consume before the state of the world is revealed.
Consider now any pair of traders and let b and s represent bid and ask prices for the buyer
and seller, respectively. The price at which each pair exchanges is determined by a pricing
rule M(b;s) with the following properties:
Assumption 2. For each trading session:
a) M(b;s) is continuous in b and s;
6b) if b = s then M(b;s) = b = s.
Without loss of generality to our subsequent analysis we shall consider M(b;s) = 1
2(b + s)4.
For a given  > 0; the timeline can be described as follows:
t = 0
0 realizes

#
endowments distributed
  t < 1   

#
trade
consumption
t = L

#
last trade
last consumption
t = 1
1 realizes

#
asset and bond pay-o
endowments distributed
2.2 The G game
Fix an  > 0: At any trading session t 2 T a buyer with endowment !0 and bid bt meeting a
seller with ask price x 2 (0;bt] and holding portfolio yt obtains utility u(!0   bt+x
2   qyt) +
Eu(!1 +  + yt); where q denotes the price of the bond when the frequency of trade in the
OTC market is  and yt the agent's bond's holding at session t. Similarly, a seller with total
wealth !0 and ask price st meeting a buyer with bid x 2 [st;1) and holding portfolio yt
obtains utility u(!0 + st+x
2   qyt) + Eu(!1 + yt): We assume preferences and endowments'
distribution to be common knowledge so that agents can compute the distribution of bid
and ask prices in order to maximize their expected utility.
Therefore, the -step optimization problem at t 2 T for agent of type a = b;s active in the
market is given by:
V
b
 (t;in;!0) = max
bt
Z bt
0
[u(!0  
bt + x
2
  qY;t) + Eu(!1 +  + Y;t)]dF
s
;t(x)
+ (1   F
s
;t(bt))V
b
 (t + ; in;!0); (1)
Y;t 2 argmax
yt
u(!0  
bt + x
2
  qyt) + Eu(!1 +  + yt) for all x < bt;
4Dierent trading rules may satisfy Assumption 2. For example if the buyer (seller) makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oer, then M(b;s) = b (M(b;s) = s). If the proposer (buyer or seller) is chosen randomly with equal
probability then one obtains M(b;s) = 1
2(b+s) as in Gale (1986). The bargaining can have a Nash solution
at each t such that M(b;s) = zbt + (1   z)s where the weight z is exogenously given as in Due, G^ arleanu
and Pedersen (2005) and (2007).
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s
 (t;in;!0) = max
st
Z 1
st
[u(!0 +
st + x
2
  qY;t) + Eu(!1 + Y;t)]dF
b
;t(x)
+ F
b
;t(st )V
s
 (t + ; in;!0); (2)
Y;t 2 argmax
yt
u(!0 +
st + x
2
  qyt) + Eu(!1 + yt) for all x > st;
where V a
 (t;in;!0) is the value function at t for the agent with endowment !0; F s
;t(bt) is the
proportion at t of sellers willing to sell for a price less than bt; F b
;t(s;t ) is the proportion
of buyers at t willing to buy for a price strictly less than s;t and nally q is the price of
the asset when the trading frequency in the OTC market is : Between any two consecutive
trading sessions t and t +  2 T (i.e., the interval (t;t + )) the agents' value functions are
xed at V a
 (t + ;in;!0): The same holds for agents' history, bid and ask prices and their
distribution, all being held constant in the interval (t;t + ) at their t +  value.
Once the last trading opportunity has elapsed and before the returns are distributed the
value function for an agent that could not nd a match is given by:
V
b
 (1;in;!0) = maxy1(!0   qy1) + Eu(!1 + y1); (3)
V
s
 (1;in;!0) = maxy1u(!0   qy1) + Eu(!1 +  + y1): (4)
Notice that the problems dened in equations (1) and (2) are non-stationary. Equations (3)
and (4) give the terminal values which prevents the value function to be unbounded.
The optimal trading strategies for the buyer and seller with endowment !0 are represented
by the vectors (Y b
;t(!0);B;t(!0)) : Ht ! <2
+ [ ;; and (Y s
;t(!0);S;t(!0)) : Ht ! <2
+ [
;; respectively. History taking value out is mapped into the empty set. For notational
convenience we will avoid the reference to the endowment when writing bond holdings and
trading strategies, and will denote them as Y;t;B;t and S;t; respectively. Given a set of
trading sessions T; the G game is specied by the array:
G =



; V
a
 (t;ht;!
a
0);at;H;t;F
a
;t;Y
a
;t a = b;s;t 2 T

:
where 
0 = f!0g is the set of all agents and Ht : 
0 !
Q
t Ht is the set of all feasible
8histories for all agents in G at time t.
In the appendix we provide a denition of the (subgame perfect) equilibrium for G and
sketch a proof of the existence. However, our results on the volume of trade will follow from
the characterization of individuals' trading strategies and not from the characterization of
the equilibrium behavior. Unless necessary for clarity of exposition and in order to simplify
notation we will drop the reference to the history in the value function.
The following lemma shows that the optimal bond holding decision does not depend on the
time at which trade in the asset occurs and on the frequency of the sessions. This property
substantially simplies the analysis of the dynamics of portfolio holding.
Lemma 1. The optimal bond holding is t and -independent, i.e., Y;t = Y for all t 2 T:
The bond's price and the last trading session value function are -independent i.e., q = q
and V b
 (1;in;!0)  V
a
(!0); a = s;b:
Proof of Lemma 1: See Appendix.
We shall show the dynamics of both bids and ask prices is monotonic. Substituting the
solution S;t in the seller's problem (2) obtain:
V
s
 (t;!0) =
Z 1
S;t
[u(!0 +
S;t + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]dF
b
;t(x) (5)
+ F
b
;t(S;t )V
s
 (t + ;!0):
This can be written as:
V
s
 (t;!0)   V
s
 (t + ;!0) (6)
=
Z 1
S;t
[u(!0 +
S;t + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
 (t + ;!0)]dF
b
;t(x):
Since the individuals are willing to trade then:
u(!0 +
S;t + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )  V
s
 (t + ;!0); (7)
9for all x 2 [S;t;1) and  > 0:
This implies that V s
 (t;!0) is a monotone decreasing function in t and therefore continuous
except for countable many points. A similar argument holds for the buyer.
Letting lim!0 V a
 (t+;!0)  V a(t;!0); for a = b;s it follows that the function V a(t;!0) for
a = b;s is Lp integrable with respect to t and is nite5.
2.3 The deadline eect
We are now in the position to prove the main result on the dynamics of trade in the presence
of a known deadline at t = 1. We shall analyze the game for frequent enough trading sessions,
i.e.,  ! 0 (or, equivalently, L ! 1). From (6) it follows that:
V
s
 (t;!0)   V
s
 (t + ;!0)
=
Z 1
S;t
[u(!0 +
S;t + x   qY
2
) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
 (t + ;!0)]dF
b
;t(x)

Z 1
S;t
[u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
 (t + ;!0)]dF
b
;t(x) (8)
= [u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
 (t + ;!0)]
 
1   F
b
;t(S;t)

:
From (8) it follows that for a given trading sessiont 2 Ti;:
lim
!0
[V
s
 (t;!0)   V
s
 (t + ;!0)]
 lim
!0[u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
 (t + ;!0)]
 
1   F
b
;t(S;t)

:
5Remark: By Lusin's Theorem (p. 230, Billingsley (1986)), V s(t;!0); can be approximated arbitrarily
close by a continuous function. This implies that the set of -step sellers' problems dened by (2) for which
the value functions V s(t;!i) are continuous in t are dense in the set of all -step sellers' problems. Hence the
set of problems for which the continuation values are discontinuous is negligible. Similarly, the set of -step
buyer's problems dened in (1) is also dense.
10Assuming that F b
;t(S;t) < 16 it follows that:
0  lim
!0[u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]   lim
!0V
s
 (t + ;!i);
lim
!0
V
s
 (t + ;!0)  lim
!0
[u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]: (9)
Since the seller is willing to trade at S;t then:
lim
!0
[u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]  lim
!0
V
s
 (t + ;!0): (10)
Therefore, from (9) and (10) obtain:
lim
!0V
s
 (t + ;!0) = lim
!0[u(!0 + S;t   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]: (11)
Dene lim!0 S;t  St;lim!0 B;t  Bt
7 and lim!0 V
b
(!i+1)  V
b
(!i+1). Also, dene
F a
t ; a = b;s as the distributions of the limiting bids and ask prices, respectively.
Equation (11) becomes:
V
s(t;!0) = u(!0 + St   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ): (12)
Since V s
 (t;!0)  V s
 (t0;!0) for any two continuity points t;t0 2 (0;1) such that t > t0
computing the limits for  ! 0 obtain:
u(!0 + St   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )  u(!0 + St0   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ):
Since u() is monotonically increasing obtain:
St  St0; (13)
6This is equivalent to assuming that there is a positive mass of buyers who are willing to trade with
some agent !0. A value of Fb
";t = 1 for all !'s implies there is no trade. In section 2.4 we show that Fa
;t is
degenerate only when the agents are risk neutral.
7The limits St and Bt exist and is unique since u(:) is continuous and monotone.
11for all continuity points t;t0 2 (ti;ti+1) such that t > t0: A similar proof shows that:
Bt  Bt0: (14)
The following theorem summarizes the result.
Theorem 1. Suppose the trading sessions are frequent enough, i.e.,  suciently small.
Then for all continuity points t > t0 a buyer with an endowment !0 has an optimizing bid
such that:
Bt(!0)  Bt0(!0);
and a seller with endowment !0 has an optimizing ask price such that:
St(!0)  St0(!0):
Letting lim!0 S1   S1 the last session's limiting ask price S1 can be solved by using
equation (4) and (12) as:
u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y ) = u(!0 + S1) + Eu(!1): (15)
Similarly letting lim!0 B1   B1, the limiting bid for the last session is given by:
u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ) = u(!0   B1   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y ): (16)
Let v;t denote the expected volume of trade been dened as the proportion of exchanges
taking place at a given session t 2 T, i.e.,
v;t =
Z Z
1f(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B;t(!
b
0)  S;t(!
s
0)gdF
b
;t(S;t(!
s
0))dF
s
;t(B;t(!
b
0));
where 1fg is an indicator event and !a denotes the endowment of agent of type a = b;s:
12Therefore the expected volume of trade is simply the probability of trade:
v;t = Prf(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B;t(!
b
0)  S;t(!
s
0)g:
Let now vt  lim!0 v;t and lim!0 v;1   v. The following theorem shows that the
probability of trade is higher the closer to the date of the announcement. This implies that
the volume of trade is non-decreasing. We shall further show in Section 2.4 and 2.5 that the
probability of trade is either zero (when constant) or strictly increasing. Hence, vt = vt0 for
t > t0 implies vt = 0:
Theorem 2. For any two continuity points t;t0 2 (0;1) such that t > t0; v  vt  vt0.
Proof of Theorem 2: See Appendix.
Theorem 1 and 2 are intuitive: buyers start from a low bid and increase their oer as the
deadline approaches. Sellers behave symmetrically. Though intuitive this might not nec-
essarily be the case as the two opposite eects drive the dynamics of individual strategies.
The rst is due to the approaching deadline: given the distribution of the ask prices, buyers
need to improve their oers so to increase the probability of trade as the number of future
opportunities of trading deteriorates overtime; similarly for the sellers. The second eect
comes from the dynamics of the price distributions of the counterparty: since the distribu-
tion of ask prices is improving overtime, each buyer should decrease (not increase) his bid.
Similarly, each seller should increase (not decrease) her ask price. However, Equation (11)
shows that the present distribution of the counterparty is irrelevant for determining the op-
timal ask price: as trading sessions become more frequent the value of waiting increases up
to the point where the optimal asking price is the one at which the seller is just indierent
between consuming now the amount he is willing to trade for, or realizing the continuation
value (i.e., waiting for the next trading session); being the continuation value monotonic, so
is the optimal sellers' strategy. The same holds for the buyers 8.
8This reminds us of the optimal bidders' strategy in sealed-bid second price auctions where agents bid
their \true value" of the object.
132.4 Risk neutral agents
In this section we study the patterns of trade in an economy entirely populated by risk
neutral agents and show that in this case all transactions occur in the rst trading session.
This implies that if increasing trade is observed then agents must be risk averse and the loss
of trade due to early arrival of information entails a loss of insurance opportunities.
Let agents' preferences be represented by any linear function u(x) = k1 + k2x where k1 and
k2 are two constant (and k2 is positive). Let the distribution of endowments as described
above.
Lemma 2. For all t 2 (0;1) and for all  > 0 the continuation values are constant and they
are given by:
V
a
 (t;!0) = V
a(t;!0) = V
a
(!0); a = b;s:
Proof of Lemma 2: See Appendix.
Theorem 3. If agents are risk neutral then the bids and ask prices are endowment and
-independent, constant and given by:
B;t = B1 = S;t = S1 = E():
Proof of Theorem 3: See Appendix.
Theorem 3 states that risk neutral buyers and sellers have the same endowment-independent
reservation price given by the expected value of the future returns. Since we assumed agents
to trade when bt  st; it follows that when agents are risk neutral they trade at the very
rst opportunity and the volume (i.e., the probability) of trade is zero thereafter.
2.5 Strict risk aversion is necessary for the deadline eect
In the previous section we proved that when agents are risk neutral then bids and ask prices
are stationary and degenerate for all trading sessions following the rst one, i.e., t > .
We now strengthen the result by ruling out such behavior for risk averse agents by showing
that it can occurs if and only if agents are risk neutral. We start by showing that a constant
14volume of trade for all sessions after the rst is possible if and only if the bid and ask prices
are stationary. We then show that the latter occurs only under risk neutrality, which in turn
implies by Theorem 3 that the volume of trade is nil for all t > :
The following lemma shows that if trade is at or there is no trade after the rst trading
session, then the distribution of bid and ask prices must be stationary.
Lemma 3. The probability of trade is constant after the rst trading session (i.e., t >  for
t 2 T) if and only if the bid and ask prices are stationary for almost all sellers and buyers,
i.e., vt = v if and only if for some bid and ask prices S0(!) and B0(!):
Prf!0 : St(!0) = S(!0) for all t > g = 1; (17)
and
Prf!0 : Bt(!0) = B(!0) for all t > g = 1: (18)
Proof of Lemma 3: See Appendix.
Note that (17) and (18) imply that F b
t (x) = F b(x) and F s
t (x) = F s(x) are stationary
distributions. We are now in a position to prove the following result.
Theorem 4. Buyers and sellers are risk neutral if and only if the probability of trade is 1.
Proof of Theorem 4: See Appendix.
Theorem 4 implies that if trade is positive for t >  and the schedule is credible, then its
dynamics must be strictly increasing. In fact, it rules out the possibility that increasing
dynamics might occur in an economy populated by risk neutral agents only.
2.6 The welfare eect of an early information release
Consider now an o schedule and unanticipated information release. Once information is
conveyed to the markets, the asset looses its role of insurance instrument and becomes
redundant. Its rate of return is now pinned down by the bond's rate of return as no buyer
would oer more and no seller would ask less than the risk free rate. Being the price xed,
the OTC market becomes inactive after the session following the announcement.
15It follows that an unanticipated early release of information entails a welfare loss equivalent
to assigning to each active trader the utility obtained by holding the bond only.
This is obviously not the case if agents are risk neutral as agents are just indierent between
trading over-the-counter and in the bond market; moreover since in this case all trade occurs
in the rst trading session an early release of information has no eect on their welfare.
We can summarize the results in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. An early release of information at any time t entails a welfare loss for any
active risk averse trader a = b;s with endowment ! equal to:
V
a(t;!)   V
a
(!):
2.7. Stochastic deadlines
This section analyzes traders' behavior in the case of stochastic deadlines, i.e., when traders
assign a positive probability to the event the information provider acts at a t < 1.
In this section we show that such a probability is strictly positive at any time and the volume
of trade is positive and uniform.
Suppose that the timing when the announcement is due is stochastic. Let there be an
announcement at t < 1, then for every point t 2 (0;1) dene t as:
1   t = Pr(Announcement at t): (19)
Assumption 3. The probability of an o schedule announcement is strictly positive for all
t, i.e.,
sup
t2(0;1)
t < 1: (20)
As before we consider each agents -step problem, where the agents failing to successfully
exchange with the counterparty proceed to the next period. In this case, however, at each
trading section following any t an announcement reaches the market with probability 1 t+.
In that event the agents that have not traded as yet, are left with the autarkic utility
16V
a
(!0);a = b;s.
The optimization problem for any  > 0 can now be written as:
V
b
 (t;in;!0;t) = max
bt
Z bt
0
[u(!0  
bt + x
2
  qYt) + Eu(!1 +  + Yt)]dF
s
;t(x;t) (21)
+ (1   F
s
;t(bt;t))[t+V
b
 (t + ;in;!0;t) + (1   t+)u(!1 + Yt)];
Yt 2 argmax
yt
u(!  
bt + x
2
  qyt) + Eu(!1 +  + yt) for all x < bt
V
s
 (t;in;!0;t) = max
st
Z 1
st
[u(!0 +
st + x
2
  qYt) + Eu(!1 + Yt)]dF
b
;t(x;t) (22)
+ F
b
;t(st;t)[t+V
s
 (t + ;in;!0;t) + (1   t+)(!0 + Yt)];
Yt 2 argmax
yt
u(! +
st + x
2
  qyt) + Eu(!1 + yt) for allx < bt:
Denote by B;t(!0;t) and S;t(!1;t) the solutions to problem (21) and (22), respectively.
The next result shows that bid and ask prices as well as bond holdings, are independent of
time and frequency (but not of the endowment). This follows from the stationarity of the
problem under stochastic deadlines.
Theorem 6. Under Assumption (3), for a given !0 and for any trading frequency " > 0:
a) the value function V a
 (t;in;!0;t) = V a(t;!0) = V
a
(!0); a = b;s;
b) the bids and ask prices, i.e. B;t(!0;t) and S;t(!0;t), are stationary and t-independent.
Proof of Theorem 6: See Appendix.
The following theorem shows that risk averse agents facing an uncertain deadline behave
at each instant as they would behave at the last trading opportunity in a credible schedule
regime, i.e., they use their last period's bids and ask prices. Recall that these are the prices
that give the the same level of utility of the autarkic equilibrium. It follows that the trading
volumes remains constant.
Theorem 7. Under stochastic deadlines the bids, ask prices and the volume of trade are
given by:
17a) S;t(!0;t) = S1(!);B;t(!0;t) = B1(!),
b) v = Prf!0 : B;t(!0;t)  S;t(!0;t)g = v1,
where B1, S1 are the last session prices (see (15) and (16)) and v1 is the last session volume
under a known deadline.
Proof of Theorem 7: See Appendix.
From Theorem 7 it is possible to conclude the theoretical part with the following result
comparing the volume of trade under alternative credibility of the monetary policy schedule:
Corollary 1. The volume of trade is higher under stochastic deadlines than under credible
schedule announcements.
Welfare eect: Notice that since the reservation value for any given agent is constant and
set equal to the value of autarky, there are no adverse eects of an early release of information
and hence there is no welfare eect. However, in the scheduled case the expected utility of
a trader at t < 1 is higher than in the case of unscheduled announcements.
3. The Empirical Model
Most independent central banks, including the U.S. Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB,
deliver their monetary policy decisions to the public by announcing interest rate levels at
scheduled and publicly available dates. Scheduling monetary policy, it is usually argued,
increases \transparency, accountability and the dialogue with the public," (Bank of Canada,
(2000)). Monetary policy authorities retain the ability to act o schedule, though this
might undermine their policy's credibility. When the schedule is credible, o schedule an-
nouncements are often said to \surprise" the markets. Other monetary authorities, e.g., the
Reserve Bank of India, prefer to exercise discretion by informing the markets about rate
changes whenever considered appropriate.
Under the hypotheses of rational expectations, no transaction costs and complete competitive
markets, the procedures and timing of the announcements would hardly matter as prices
would perfectly reect information and traders would continuously adjust their portfolios.
18Our theoretical model argues that this might not be the case in over-the-counter markets,
by showing that xing the dates of information delivery changes agents' optimal trading
strategies and in turn the dynamics of trade. This occurs only when the schedule is credible.
Moreover, surprising the market by moving forward the information release might prevent
risk-sharing improving trade to take place.
In this section we apply these theoretical ndings to the FOMC monetary policy scheduling
from 3rd January 1995 to 31th July 2010 and look at the impact on the dynamics of trade of
the CBOT 30-Day Federal Funds Futures market. These are contracts of $5mil size on the
daily federal funds overnight rate reported by the New York Fed9. The 1995 date started a
period lasting till 1998 during which the monetary committee was very consistent in following
the schedule. Throughout this 15 years' period the FOMC had 128 scheduled meetings and
17 o schedule meetings10. Only 4 of these latter led to a change of rate: the quarter point
reduction on 18/19 of October 1998 and the half point cuts on 3rd January 2001, 18th April
and 17th September 2001.
Our rst aim is to identify the periods of credible monetary policy schedule: the model
shows that these are characterized by a signicant deadline eect prior to the scheduled
announcements. Recall that a deadline eects occur only under credible scheduling (Theorem
1 and 7) and if and only if agents are risk averse (Theorem 2 and 3). In order to identify the
periods of credible monetary policy scheduling we use rolling windows of 400 days with a 60
days overlapping gap. Our second aim is to quantify the loss of trade due to unanticipated
information releases. For the latter we start by looking at meetings occurring during periods
of credible scheduling but o the regular schedule. The absence of a deadline eect prior
to these events would indicate that these were unanticipated. The implication is that o
schedule announcements must have conveyed information to the active risk averse agents
prior to risk sharing trading, amounting to a welfare loss. We proxy the latter by looking at
the average of lost trade due to an early information release.
9See also http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont detail/0,3206,1525+14446,00.html.
10When the o schedule meetings occur at non-trading days, we take the rst trading day after the meeting
as the eective announcement day.
193.1 Modeling trading volume
We look at the trading volume of short term interest rate futures as a function of changes of
the federal funds rate following the announcements of scheduled and o schedule meetings
by analyzing the following model:
vt = f(rti   Et(rti+1)) +
PJ
j= J(0
jSD0
t j + jUD
+
t j + jSD
+
t j) + t;
where vt is the daily volume traded of CBOTr 30-Day Federal Funds Futures at time t in
the Chicago Board of Trade. rt is the federal funds rate at t determined by the FOMC
after the meetings, either scheduled or unscheduled. The volume of trading vt depends on
the gap rti   Et(rti+1); where rti is the actual interest rate at t before the meeting at i + 1
and Et(rti+1) is the market expectation of change of rate at the i + 1th meeting given public
information at time t.
In order to capture the eects on the volume of trade when the interest rate changes, we
dierentiate between the announcements that lead to a change the federal fund rate from
the ones that do not by introducing the following dummy variables:
SD
0
t = I [jrtj = 0 and there is a scheduled meeting at t];
and
SD
+
t = I [jrtj 6= 0 and there is a scheduled meeting at t];
where I is an indicator function. SD0
t j and SD
+
t j; j = 1;::;J capture the eects of possible
excess trading the day before scheduled announcements whereas to capture the increase in
trade the day after the announcements we include the dummies SD0
t+j and SD
+
t+j; j = 1;::;J:
We also introduce a separate but similar set of variables in order to capture the eects of
the surprise, or o schedule rate changes, by introducing the following dummy variable:
UD
+
t = I [jrtj 6= 0 and there is a o schedule meeting at t]:
20In order to capture the eects of possible excess trading the day before the o schedule
announcement we use UD
+
t j;j = 1;::;J: For the day after announcement eects we include
the lead dummies UD
+
t+j;j = 1;::;J:
We model the dierence in interest rate expectations from the realized value rt   Et(ri) as
a function of the dierence in output growth i.e., yt = yt+1   Et+1(yt); and in ination
expectation11 t = t+1  Et+1(t). We model volume as a function of absolute magnitude
changes of the dierence between the median and the forecast values of output growth and
ination. We obtain:
vt = c + 1 jtj + 2 jytj
+
PJ
j= J(0
jSD0
t j + jUD
+
t j + jSD
+
t j) + t:
(23)
3.2 Results
Our test identies two sub-periods in our data set: the rst, till September 2001, where
there is statistically signicant excess trade (i.e., a deadline eect) two and one day before a
announcement of a rate change. The second period following September 2001 where there is
no signicant change in excess trade prior to scheduled announcements. Figure 1 plots the
t-values of 0
1 and 0
2 for the excess trade one day before and two days before a scheduled
announcement for the period January 1995-September 2001 and October 2010-July 2010,
respectively. Each bar on the graphs represents a 400-day window. If in any of the rolling
periods one of the three events SD
+
t j;SD0 or UD+ does no occur we drop the respective
dummy variables for that period and the corresponding a window in the gure will appear
blank. The three horizontal lines indicate the signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Figure 2
represent the plots for the two periods for the average volume of trade the day of a scheduled
meetings followed by an interest rate change, one and two days prior to that meeting along
11The data on expectations are obtained from Datastream.
21with the average of all the other days.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
An obvious question to ask is why the credibility of monetary policy has been aected after
September 2001. Although several reasons can be attributed to changes in traders' beliefs,
our model is silent about the reasons aecting the schedule's credibility.
We can then turn to the to evaluation of the loss of trading volume due to unanticipated
information arrivals. Recall that the emphasis is on the timing of information arrival and
not on its content. The relevant events in this case are the four o schedule announcements
that led to a change in interest rate. Notice that all of them occurred before October 2001,
the period with signicant deadline eects of schedule announcements and hence of credible
scheduling. We rst show that these were indeed surprises to the market by verifying the
absence of a deadline eect the days prior to these announcements. Table 1 summarizes the
results of the tests12.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE]
Finally, in order to quantify the loss of trade we look at the average excess trade one and
two days before each o schedule announcement compared to the value of the intercept in
the table, i.e.,

b j   b j

=b c; j =  1; 2: We nd that an average excess trade of 49% the
day before and 37% two days before the announcement.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that scheduling the communication of payo relevant public infor-
mation changes nancial markets' behavior non-trivially by entailing a deadline eect. The
12Since in the second period there are no o schedule announcements followed by changes in interest rates
we drop the variables UD
+
t j during that period.
22theoretical contribution has shown that observables like trading volume dynamics can iden-
tify welfare eects of credible scheduling. We apply the theoretical model to the FOMC
monetary policy announcements. We rst identify the periods of credible monetary policy
and then we show that in those periods unscheduled announcements entail a loss of trade.
Some nal observations are in order: 1) our welfare analysis focuses on the general equilib-
rium eect leading to a loss of insurance opportunities and abstracts from other potentially
benecial eects that might arise from an early release of information. As pointed out by
Gottardi and Rahi (2008), if there is room for trade after the new information has reached
the market, agents can achieve a larger set of state contingent payos by conditioning their
portfolios on this information: if markets are suciently incomplete, the latter positive eect
might overcome the welfare loss due to the Hirshleifer eect. This important point is beyond
the aim of our analysis; 2) our paper is also silent about trade increases observed after a
FOMC announcement. We do not account for this eect though this increase clearly shows
up in our data. It is well known that trade for many asset classes increases right after news
are released. Following the argument provided in our model, one may conjecture that in
the presence of agents with dierent degrees of risk aversion, risk neutral agents trade rst
(right after the news reaches the market) and risk averse agents only later; 3) the dynamics
of trade in interest rates futures is substantially dierent than the one observed prior to
scheduled corporate announcements where trade is depressed rather than increased. The
nancial economics literature has identied informational asymmetries as the main reason
for the volume of trade to decrease as uninformed agents avoid the exchange with informed
counterparties13. If trading volume before scheduled announcements is indeed correlated
with the extent of information asymmetries then our empirical ndings would imply that
there are little informational asymmetries on monetary policy decisions.
13For the theoretical literature see Admati and Pfeinderer (1988) and Forster and Viswanathan (1990).
For the empirical studies see Chae (2005). For alternative explanations see George, Kaul, and Nimalendran
(1994)).
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27Table 1: Estimation Results. Dependent Variable: Volume
From : 03-Jan-1995 to 30-Sept-2001
R
2
0.16
DW 0.66
T 1673 K 18
Variable Coecient t-statistic t-probability
const 4201.94 33.30 0.00
yt 95.45 0.10 0.92
t 4246.67 0.86 0.39
SD
+
 2 4985.58 4.48 0.00
SD
+
 1 5911.39 5.32 0.00
SD
+
0 13514.13 12.14 0.00
SD
+
1 8618.00 7.75 0.00
SD
+
2 4369.75 3.93 0.00
SD0
 2 -810.41 -1.01 0.31
SD0
 1 -610.00 -0.76 0.45
SD0
0 1758.77 2.19 0.03
SD0
1 -33.51 -0.04 0.97
SD0
2 -1140.34 -1.42 0.16
UD
+
 2 3444.39 1.27 0.20
UD
+
 1 3865.61 1.42 0.15
UD
+
0 17781.72 6.56 0.00
UD
+
1 13043.72 4.81 0.00
UD
+
2 5596.06 2.07 0.04
28Table 2: Estimation Results. Dependent Variable: Volume
From : 01-Oct-2001 to 02-Jul-2010
R
2
0.02
DW 0.37
T 2176 K 13
Variable Coecient t-statistic t-probability
const 25837.46 35.76 0.00
yt 4259.44 0.86 0.39
t -4185.36 -0.35 0.73
SD
+
 2 -2913.41 -0.50 0.61
SD
+
 1 -4773.36 -0.83 0.41
SD
+
0 14986.61 2.59 0.01
SD
+
1 3983.38 0.69 0.49
SD
+
2 -5517.07 -0.96 0.34
SD0
 2 8067.29 1.66 0.10
SD0
 1 12530.17 2.57 0.01
SD0
0 24585.18 5.04 0.00
SD0
1 11644.65 2.39 0.02
SD0
2 7321.35 1.49 0.14
29Appendix
Denition 1. By equilibrium of G we mean the subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e.: for each
buyer at t 2 ((l   1);l] with history ht = in and endowment !b
0 the equilibrium strategy
(Y 
;t(!b
0);B
;t(!b
0)) is the solution to problem (1) when f(Y 
;t(!b
0);B
;t(!b
0)) : t 2 (l;L]g are
his future strategies and fF s
;t : t 2 ((l 1);L]g are the present and future distributions of the
active sellers equilibrium asking prices fS
;t(!s
0)) : t 2 ((l 1);L]g for all !s
0; similarly, for
each seller at t 2 ((l 1);l] with history ht = in and endowment !s
0 the equilibrium strategy
(Y 
;t(!s
0);S
;t(!s
0)) is the solution to the problem (2) when f(Y 
;t(!s
0);S
;t(!s
0)) : t 2 (l;L]g
are her future strategies and fF b
;t : t 2 (l;L]g are the present and future distributions of
active buyers equilibrium bids fB
;t(!b
0) : t 2 (l;L]g for all !s
0. Finally, the bond market
clears, i.e. at equilibrium q
 is such that:
Z 1
0
Z Z
[Y

;t(!
b
0) + Y

;t(!
s
0)]dF
b
;t(S

;t(!
s
0))dF
s
;t(B

;t(!
b
0))dt = 0
In Lemma 1 we show that the optimal bond's holding is independent of  and t: The existence
of the equilibrium can be shown by backward induction and by noting that the only relevant
state is in: The equilibrium in session t = L follows from Mas-Colell (1984) and hence for
all trading session t 2 f;:::;(L   1)g:
Proof of Lemma 1:
Dene the following static problem:
G(s;Y : !;V;F
b) =
Z 1
s
[u(! +
s + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]dF
b(x) + F
b(s)V;
s:t: Y 2 argmax
y u(! +
s + x
2
  qy) + Eu(!1 + y)for all x > st
30or:
G(s;Y : !;V;F
b) =
Z 1
s
[u(! +
s + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1   Y )]dF
b(x) + F
b(s)V;
s:t u
0

! +
s + x
2
  qY

= Eu
0 (!1 + Y )
Writing the Lagrangian as:
L(s;x;y : !;V;F b) = [u(! + s+x
2   qy) + Eu(!1 + y)]I [x > s] + I [x < s]V
+(x)

u0  
! + s+x
2   qy

  Eu0 (!1 + y)

;
we note that the Lagrangian is independent of F b:
Letting Y the argmax of the Lagrangian, we obtain:
@Y
@V
=  
@L
@V @y
=
@L
@2y
  

y=Y
:
Computing the derivative with respect to y :
@L(s;x;y : !;V;F b)
@y
= u
0(! +
s + x
2
  qy)   Eu
0(!1 +  + y)] +
(x)

u
00

! +
s + x
2
  qy

+ Eu
00 (!1 +  + y)

= (x)

u
00

! +
s + x
2
  qy

+ Eu
00 (!1 +  + y)

@L(s;y : !;V;F b)
@y@V
= 0;
therefore obtain:
@Y
@V
= 0: (24)
hence Y does not change with V:
31Note that
V
s
 (t;!0) =max
s G(s;Y : !0;V
s
 (t + ;!0);F
b
t )
V
s
 (t
0;!0) =max
s
G(s;Y : !0;V
s
 (t
0;!0);F
b
t0) fort > t
0:
Since by (24) Yt = argmaxy L(s;x;y : !;V s
 (t+;!0);F b
t ) does not change with V s
 (t+;!0),
we have:
Yt = Yt0 = Y:
The  independence of the last period value functions follow from equations (3) and (4).
The following two results (Lemma A1 and Lemma A2) will be useful in proving Lemma2 in
the text.
Lemma A 1. The risk neutral agent's value function is such that:
@V a
 (t;!0)
@!0
= k2 for all t 2 T; a = b;s: (25)
Proof of Lemma A 1: Consider the -step problem for the trader of type s and endowment
!0. For t = 1 the derivative of the last trading session value function (4) is given by:
@V s
 (1;!0)
@!0
=
@u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y )
@!0
= k2:
If (25) holds for t +  then it holds for any t 2 T: In fact since S;t is the argmax of the
problem in (2) it follows that:
@V s
 (t;!0)
@!0
=
Z 1
S;t
@
@!0
[u(!0 +
S;t + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]dF
b
;t(x)
+ F
b
;t(S;t)
@
@!0
V
s
 (t + ;!0):
32Therefore:
@V s
 (t;!0)
@!0
=
Z 1
S;t
k2dF
b
;t(x) + F
b
;t(S;t)k2 = k2:
It now suces to notice that this is true for all -step problems to obtain the result. The
proof is similar for buyers.
Lemma A 2. The risk neutral agents' reservation price is endowment independent, i.e.:
@B;t
@!0
=
@S;t
@!0
= 0; for all t 2 T:
Proof of Lemma A 2: Consider a risk-neutral agent as in the proof of Lemma A 1. For a
given t 2 T dene:
G;t(st;!0) =
Z 1
st
[u(!0 +
st + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]dF
b
;t(x)
+ F
b
;t(st)V
s
 (t + ;!0);
and notice that:
G;t(S;t;!0) = V
s
 (t;!0):
Being S;t the argmax and the second derivative of G;t negative, we obtain :
@S;t
@!0
=  
@G;t(st;!0)
@st@!0
@G;t(st;!0)
@st@st
  
 
st=S;t
:
Computing the derivative with respect to !0 and using Lemma 1 obtain:
@G;t(st;!0)
@!0
=
Z 1
st
@
@!0
[u(!0 +
st + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1+)]dF
b
;t(x)
+ F
b
;t(st)
@
@!0
V
s
 (t + ;!0)
=
Z 1
st
k2dF
b
;t(x) + F
b
;t(st)k2 = k2;
33then:
@G;t(st;!0)
@st@!0
= 0:
It follows that:
@S;t
@!0
= 0; for all t 2 T:
The proof is similar for the buyers.
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider two continuity points t;t0 2 (0;1) such that t > t0: Consider
also a seller s with endowment !s
0 and a buyer b with endowment !b
0 such that for some
\trading frequency"  > 0; B;t0(!b
0) > S;t0(!s
0). Then from Proposition (13) and (14) we
have B;t(!b
0)  B;t0(!s
0) and S;t(!s
0)  S;t0(!s
0); we obtain B;t(!b
0) > S;t(!s
0).
Therefore,
f(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B;t(!
b
0) > S;t(!
s
0)g  f(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B;t0(!
b
0) > S;t0(!
s
0)g:
It follows that:
v;t = Prf(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B;t(!
b
0) > S;t(!
s
0)g
 Prf(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B;t0(!
b
0) > S;t0(!
s
0)g = v;t0:
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the -step problem. By Lemma A 2 since the ask prices
S;t and the bid prices B;t are independent of the endowment !0 at each t 2 T then the
distribution F b
t;(x) is degenerate. Let  B;t be the degenerate bid of the buyers, then:
dF b
;t(x) = 1 if x =  Bt;
= 0 otherwise.
Notice that since the distribution of bids is degenerate at  B;t; no seller will ask strictly less
than  B;t and hence it will be optimal to proceed to the next interval. Therefore F b
;t(S;t) = 1:
34Hence it follows from (5) that:
V
s
 (t;!0) = V
s
 (t + ;!0) for all t 2 T and for all  > 0:
Since V s
 (1;!0) = u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y ) from equation (4) the result follows. The
proof is similar for the buyers' reservation price.
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider two points t;t0 2 (0;1) such that t > t0: By Lemma 2 and
computing the limit as  ! 0:
V
s(t;!0) = V
s(t
0;!0)
u(!0 + St   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ) = u(!0 + St0   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ):
It follows that:
St = St0:
The same is true for the bid prices Bt.
In the last trading session, the ask price S1 can be solved as:
u(!0 + S1   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ) = u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y );
or
S1 =
E(!1 +  + Y )   E(!1 + Y )
k2
for all !0:
Similarly, in the last period the bid B0 can be solved as:
u(!0   B1   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y ) = u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ):
It follows that:
B

1 =
Eu(!1 +  + Y )   Eu(!1 + Y )
k2
for all !0:
35Then obtain:
P1 = B1 = S1 =
Eu(!1 +  + Y )   Eu(!1 + Y )
k2
= : (26)
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose equations (17) and (18) hold. Then for any pair t 6= t0 2 (0;1)
following the rst trading session and a trading frequency  > 0:
vt = Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  S(!
s
0)
	
= vt0:
If instead (17) does not hold then by (13) there exists a t such that for all t > t there exists
a subset of sellers such that:

t = f!
s
0 : St(!
s
0) > St(!
s
0)g and Pr(
t) > 0:
This implies:
vt = Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  St(!
s
0)
	
= Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  St(!
s
0) s.t. !
s
0 2 
t)
	
+ Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  S(!
s
0) s.t. !
s
0 2 

c
t
	
< Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  St(!
s
0) s.t. !
s
0 2 
t)
	
+ Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  S(!
s
0)s.t. !
s
0 2 

c
t
	
= Pr

(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B(!
b
0)  St(!
s
0)
	
= vt:
a contradiction. Similarly if (18) does not hold there is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4: Consider a seller with endowment !0: Since:
u(!0 + S1   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ) = u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y );
36and Eu(!1 + Y ) < Eu(!1 +  + Y ) then S1 > 0. By Lemma 3 and the envelope theorem:
@V s(t;!0)
@!0
=
Z 1
S1
@
@!0

u(!0 +
S1 + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )

dF
b(x);
+ F
b(S1)
@
@!0
V
s(t + ;!0);
u
0(!0   qY ) =
Z 1
S1
u
0(!0 +
S1 + x
2
  qY )dF
b(x) + F
b(S1)u
0(!0   qY )
0 =
Z 1
S1

u
0(!0   qY )   u
0(!0 +
S1 + x
2
  qY )

dF
b(x) for all !0 and x  S1:
Since u00  0 we have u0(!0 +  + Y )   u0(!0 +
S1+x
2 + Y )  0 for almost all x  S1: So the
last equation is true if:
u
0(!0   qY ) = u
0(!i +
S1 + x
2
  qY ) for a.e. x  S1; or (27)
dF
b(x) = 0 for all x  S1: (28)
If (27) is true then the utility is linear. If (28) is true then the distribution of bid prices are
degenerate at some B0 for all !0's:
u(!0   B
0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y ) = u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ); for all !0:
Computing the derivatives obtain:
u
0(!0   B
0   qY ) = u
0(!0   qY ); for all !0;
implying that the utility function is linear.
Proof of Theorem 6: Consider a seller with endowment !0: Consider the lagrangian
37function:
L(s;x;y : !;V;V ) = [u(! +
s + x
2
+ y) + Eu(!1 +    y)]I [x > s] + I [x < s]

V + (1   )V

+(x)

u
0

! +
s + x
2
+ y

  Eu
0 (!1 +    y)

:
Notice that V s
 (t;!0;t) =
R 1
S;t(!0;t) L(s;x;Y";t : !;V s
 (t + ;!0;t+);V
s
(!1))dF b
;t(x;t):
Then dene a functional  : V ! V, where V is the space of bounded continuous functions
such that:
(V
s
 (t;!0;t)) =
Z 1
S;t(!0;t)
L(S;t(!0;t);x;Y";t : !;V
s
 (t;!0;t);V
s
(!1))dF
b
;t(x;t):
where (S;t(!0;t);Y";t) is the argmax of (22). We show that  is a contraction mapping. Let
V s
 (t;!0;t) and V
0s
 (t;!0;t) be two functions then:
(V
s
 (t;!0;t))   (V
0s
 (t;!0;t)) = t+F
b
;t(S;t )(V
s
 (t + ;!0;t)   V
0s
 (t + ;!0;t)):
Since supt2(0;1) t < 1 and F b
;t(S;t(!0;t))  1; we can choose a  < 1 such that supt2(0;1) t
F b
;t(S;t(!0;t) )   < 1 therefore,
 
(V
s(t;!0;t))   (V
0s(t;!0;t))
 
  
 
V
s(t + ;!0;t)   V
0s(t + ;!0;t)

 : (29)
Therefore for any  > 0, by the contraction mapping theorem it follows that: a) V s
 (t;!0;t) =
V s(t;!0;t) = V
s
0(!1): b) The ask prices are stationary and independent of t. The proof for
the bid prices is similar.
Proof of Theorem 7: From part b) of Theorem 6, let S;t(!0;t) = b S(!0) for all !0, the
stationary ask prices. Therefore F a
;t(x) = F a(x) , a = b;s are stationary distributions and
V a(t;!0;t) = V
a
(!0); a = b;s: Then:
38V
s
(!0) =
Z 1
b S(!0)
[u(!0 +
b S(!0) + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]dF
b(x)
+ F
b(b S(!0))

qt+u(!0   qY ) + (1   t+)V
s
(!0)

=
Z 1
b S(!0)
[u(!0 +
b S(!0) + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )]dF
b(x)
+ F
b(b S(!0))V
s
(!0):
Therefore:
Z 1
b S(!0)
[u(!0 +
b S(!0) + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
(!0)]dF
b(x) = 0;
implying that:
[u(!0 +
b S0(!0) + x
2
  qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y )   V
s
(!0)]dF
b(x) for almost all x 2 (b S(!0);1).
In particular, for x >b S0(!0) dF b(x) = 0 since u is strictly increasing hence
u(!0 + b S0(!0)   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ) = V
s
(!0).
Or:
u(!0 + b S0(!0)   qY ) + Eu(!1 + Y ) = u(!0   qY ) + Eu(!1 +  + Y );
that implies that b S(!0) is the price of the last trading opportunity when scheduled announce-
ments are credible (see (15)). The same argument applies to the buyers.
As before the expected volume at t; is given by:
v = Prf(!
b
0;!
s
0) : b B0(!
b
0)  b S0(!
s
0)g
= Prf(!
b
0;!
s
0) : B0(!
b
0)  S1(!
s
0)g = v;
39since the bid and ask prices are stationary.
Proof of Corollary 1: By theorem (2) and (7) for some t 2 (0;1] , v = v > vt for all t < t:
Therefore Z 1
0
vdt >
Z 1
0
vtdt:
40